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Introduction
Following several failed attempts,2 the Colombian Congress enacted
a new statute, Law 1563/12 (“New Statute”) on national and international arbitration on July 12, 2012, which was put into force on October
Tenured professor and researcher at Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana, Medellín,
Colombia; candidate to a doctoral degree in law (S.J.D.) at American University, the
Washington College of Law; Washington, D.C.; and Fulbright scholar.
2
See, e.g., Arbitraje: Nuevo Revés de Londoño [Arbitration: A New Londoño’s Set
Back], El Tiempo.com (Jun. 6, 2003)(The Colombian government filed in 2003 a bill
of law to modernize the legal rules on arbitration. This bill, unfortunately, was never
enacted), http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-998251 (last visited
Sep. 30, 2012); see also, Estudian Proyecto de Ley General de Arbitraje [A Bill on
Arbitration is Under Analysis], El Portal del Abogado, http://macastroca.blogspot.
com/2007/11/estudian-proyecto-de-ley-general-de.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2012).
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12, 2012.3 This statute, partially based on the UNCITRAL Model Law
on International Commercial Arbitration (“UNCITRAL Model Law”),
repeals many domestic legal rules4 and counteracts trends in alternative
dispute resolution, which were not in sync with the newest trends of
international arbitration.5
This Article, rather than analyze the New Statute in its entirety, limits itself to the discussion of the new legal rules on international arbitration, with special regard to the second section of the New Statute. Thus,
the new legal rules on national arbitration included in Section 1,6 the
arbitration mechanism known as “Amigable Composición,” included
in Section 2,7 and the rules of social arbitration include Section 48 are
beyond the scope of this article.
To begin, Section I discusses some of the pros and cons of the future
application of the new legal rules on international arbitration and compares Colombia’s jurisprudence with other international rules—such
as the International Chamber of Commerce rules (“ICC Rules”)—and
with comparative case law. Section II evaluates the New Statute against
the background of the New York Convention and conflicting domestic
law. Section III analyzes the future of the legislation and the prospective
impact the law will have in Colombia. Finally, the Article concludes
that new statute is a step in the right direction for arbitration and has
provided a substantive upgrade in the arbitration system.

L. 1563/12, julio 12, 2012, Diario Oficial [D.O.] (Colom.) article 119 [hereinafter
“L. 1563/12”].
4
See id. art. 118. See, e.g., L. 315/96, septiembre 16, 1996, Diario Oficial [D.O.]
(Colom.); L. 1818/98, septiembre 7, 1998, Diario Oficial [D.O.] (Colom.).
5
See Fernando Mantilla, El anteproyecto de ley de arbitraje: entre Dr. Jekyll y
Mr. Hyde [The bill of law on arbitration: between Dr. Jekyll and Mr Hyde], Ámbito
Jurídico, Jul. 26, 2011, at 10, http://www.ambitojuridico.com/BancoConocimiento.
6
See L. 1563/12 supra note 3, art. 1-58.
7
See id. art. 59–61.
8
See L. 1563/12 supra note 3, art. 117 (The last section of the new statute repeals
some legal rules and provides that L. 1563/12 will be in legal force as of October 12,
2012; L. 1563/12 supra note 3, arts. 118–19).
3
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I. An Analysis of the New Statute and its Regulations on
International Arbitration
A. Scope of “International Arbitration” Under the New
Colombian Statute
Pursuant to the Colombia New Statute, Law 1563/12,9 an arbitration proceeding is considered to be “international” when the proceeding
meets one of three sets of conditions. Though the first two categories are
derived from UNCITRAL Model Law Article 1(3), the third category
derives itself from domestic law.
In the first set, based on UNCITRAL Model Law Article 1(3)(a),10 an
arbitration proceeding is considered international if the parties’ places
of business were incorporated in different countries at the making of the
arbitration agreement. In the second set, based on UNCITRAL Model
Law Article 1(3)(b)(ii), an arbitration proceeding is international when
its place of performance has a substantial part of the contractual duties
or the place more closely connected with the subject-matter of the dispute, is outside the countries where the parties incorporated their places
of business.11
Unlike the previous categories, the third set is based on the previous
domestic law, Article 1.5 of Law 315/96, which finds no comparable
article in the UNCITRAL Model Law.12 Though repealed by the New
Statute’s legislation, Article 1.5 of Law 315/96 survives in essence
through the New Statute’s provisions. Therein, an arbitration proceeding is international when the subject-matter of the dispute affects the
interests of international commerce. Whether the subject-matter of an
arbitration proceeding affects the interests of the international commerce is a difficult question, and the answer depends highly on the facts
of the given dispute. This line of reasoning is not only in accordance
with a globalized economy, but also with the UNIDROIT Principles for
See L.1563/12 supra note 3, art. 62.
The new Colombian statute, based also on UNCITRAL Model Law, provides
that: (i) if a party has several places of business, the relevant place of business is the
one with the closest relationship to the arbitration agreement; and (ii) if a party does
not have a place of business, reference will be made to its habitual residence (this
provision is more likely to be applied to individuals and not to corporations or other
business associations, which are usually the parties to international arbitrations). See
L. 1563/12 supra note 3, art. 62.
11
UNCITRAL Model Law Article 1(3)(b)(ii).
12
See L. 1563/12 supra note 3, art. 118.
9

10
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International Commercial Contracts, pursuant to which “the concept of
‘international’ contracts should be given the broadest possible interpretation, so as ultimately to exclude only those situations where no international element at all is.”13 As such, an interpretation of the third set
will likely be broadly construed, and, therefore, almost all questionable
cases will be found to affect the interests of international commerce.
Despite a strong basis in UNCITRAL Model Law, the New Statute
has notable shortcomings. To begin, the New Statute did not include
UNCITRAL Model Law Article 1(3)(b)(i), which provides that an arbitration proceeding is international when its venue is located in a country
outside the nation of the parties’ domicile.14 Perhaps, Colombian legislators omitted this legal rule to avoid the domestic misuse of arbitration
agreements; after all, two Colombian parties could make a domestic
dispute into arbitration internal by providing a venue located outside
Colombia in their contract.
Another, more persuasive, reason is that prior to the enactment of the
New Statute, the preceding authority, L. 315/96, mirrored UNCITRAL
Model Law Art. 1(3)(b)(i); accordingly, an arbitration was international
when the arbitration agreement provided a venue situated outside the
countries where the parties have their places of business. This provision
was challenged before the Colombian Constitutional Court, which held
that it was in accordance with the Colombian Constitution if and only
if at least one of the parties to the controversy had its place of business
outside Colombia.15 In light of this judgment, the legal rule based on
UNCITRAL Model Law Art. 1(3)(a)—stating an arbitration is international when the parties’ places of business are in different countries—
conceptually undermines any legal rule based on a location of the venue
in a country other than the States where the parties have their places of
business, such as UNCITRAL Model Law Art. 1(3)(b)(1).
UNIDROIT Principles for International Commercial Contracts. But see
Consejo de Estado [C.E.] [Council of State], agosto 1, 2002, C.P. G. Villamizar
Expediente 11001-03-25-000-2001-0046-01(21041), Anales del Consejo de Estado
[An.C.E.) (Colom.) (holding that a dispute over a power purchase agreement between
TermoRio—a Colombian wholly-owned subsidiary of an U.S. corporation—and
Electranta—a Colombian corporation—was a domestic dispute even though it affected
the commerce between Colombia and the United States). See also TermoRio S.A. E.S.P.
v. Electranta S.P., 487 F.3d 928 (2007).
14
UNCITRAL Model Law Article 1(3)(b)(i)
15
See Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], julio 23, 1997, M.P.: J.
Arango, Sentencia C-347-1997, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.] (Colom.).
13
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Finally, the New Statute, in contrast with UNCITRAL Model Law,
does not provide that an arbitration proceeding is international when
“the parties have expressly agreed that the subject matter of the arbitration agreement relates to more than one country.”16 Likely, Colombian
legislators refrained from enacting this legal rule to avoid its challenge
before the Constitutional Court on the grounds that Colombian parties
do not have the freedom of contract to subject entirely domestic disputes
to international arbitration governed by both substantial and procedural
foreign legal rules.
B. Formalities of an Arbitration Agreement
Pursuant to Article 69 of the New Statute, the arbitration agreement shall be in writing. This legal rule follows the UNCITRAL Model
Law,17 which provides that a written agreement exists when the content of the arbitration agreement is recorded in any form, regardless of
whether it “has been concluded orally, by conduct, or by other means.”18
An electronic communication also amounts to a written agreement .19
Furthermore, a written agreement exists when there is an exchange of
statements in which one party claims the existence of the arbitration
agreement without the other party denying it.20 More importantly, “the
reference in a contract to any document containing an arbitration clause
constitutes an arbitration agreement in writing.”21
This incorporation by reference reduces transaction costs because
parties no longer have to renegotiate not requiring parties to relational
contracts or to repeated transactions—such as long-term supply agreements or distribution agreements—to have to bargain for arbitration.22
These agreements are not only made at the original contract stage, but
also at the formation stage of all subsequent contracts, regardless of
their complexity. These subsequent contracts may be commercial orders
or invoices, for instance.

UNCITRAL Model Law Article 1(1)(c).
Id. at art. 7(2).
18
Id. at art. 7(3).
19
Id. at art. 7(4).
20
Id. at art. 7(5).
21
Id. at art. 7(6). See generally Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International
Commercial Arbitration 272 (Emmanuel Gaillard & John Savage eds., 1999); and
Gary B. Born, International Commercial Arbitration 189, 670 (2nd ed., 2001).
22
See Ian R. Macneil, The Many Futures of Contract, 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 691 (1974).
16
17
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Unfortunately, the New Statute, does not address the role of third
party performers when addressing the key issue of arbitrability. When
parties have played a significant role in the negotiation and performance
of the underlying contract, but have not executed the arbitration agreement, they are often included in the arbitration procedure either as
claimants or as respondents.23 If Colombian arbitrators make a plain
reading of the New Statute, then they should find that any non-signatory
company or individual is not entitled to be a party to the arbitration
agreement, regardless of its participation in the negotiation of the arbitration agreement or in the performance of the underlying contract.24
Notably, Colombian jurisprudence historically limits a contract from
the unintentional binding of third parties.25
A more liberal interpretation, however, might be possible in exceptional cases. Such an exception may arise when a non-signatory company not only bargained for the arbitration agreement and performed the
underlying contract, but also belongs to the same group of companies
as one of the signatory parties. For instance, suppose that A, a whollyowned subsidiary of B, entered into an arbitration agreement with C
regarding a distribution contract. Assume also that B did not execute
the arbitration agreement, but actively participated in its negotiation
and in the performance of the distribution contract.26 The issue becomes
whether B, under the new Colombian statute, might be regarded as a
party in the arbitration procedure. The answer, under theories such as

See generally Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International Commercial
Arbitration 282–89 (Emmanuel Gaillard & John Savage eds., 1999); and Gary B.
Born, International Commercial Arbitration 668–72 (2nd ed., 2001).
24
See L. 1563/12 supra note 3, art. 69.
25
See Código Civil [C.C.] (Colom.). art. 1495 (providing that a party to a contract
is bound to the other party but not to third-parties).
26
See ICC Case No. 4131, Interim Award (1982) (holding that Dow Chemical
France and Dow Chemical Company were non-signatories parties to the arbitration
agreements governing the dispute on the grounds that they not only controlled the
subsidiaries which signed the arbitration agreements but also played a significant role
in the underlying distribution contracts).
23
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“group of companies” or “piercing the corporate veil,” may be in the
affirmative in certain cases.27
The New Statute also omits any reference to the formalities with
which an assignment of an arbitration agreement must comply.28
Suppose, paraphrasing the facts of a case law from the United States,29
that A and B execute a contract, which not only includes an arbitration
agreement, but also a clause providing that a party’s assignment is not
valid without the other party’s assent. Furthermore, suppose that during
the performance of the contract, B assigned its contractual rights and
duties to C without requesting A’s assent. Since the New Statute is silent
in this regard, the legal contract rules of the Colombian Commercial
Code become applicable. Pursuant to the Colombian Commercial
Code, the assignment of executory contracts is valid, unless the parties
have contracted around this default rule.30 Therefore, in the example
illustrated above, the assignment of the arbitration agreement would not
be valid because the assignor (B) did not obtain the obligor’s (A) assent.
C. Choosing the Governing Law of an Arbitration under the
New Statute
Article 101 of the New Statute, based on Article 28(1) of the
UNCITRAL Model Law, provides that the arbitral tribunal shall settle
disputes in accordance with the governing law that the parties to the
To pierce the corporate veil, arbitrators will need to find that the party who signed
the arbitration agreement was just an alter ego, an entity without any autonomy and
wholly controlled by another company or individual. See First Option of Chicago,
Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995) (finding a corporation, fully controlled by
two individuals, had signed an arbitration agreement. The other party initiated an
arbitration procedure against both the corporation and the individuals, who had not
signed the arbitration agreement. The arbitrators held that the individuals were part
of the arbitration agreement because they had an unmistakable intent to subject the
matter of the dispute to arbitration).
28
See generally Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International Commercial
Arbitration 417–46 (Emmanuel Gaillard & John Savage eds., 1999).
29
See Apollo Computer, Inc. v. Berg, 886 F.2d 469, 472–74 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding
that the assignment of an arbitration agreement whose underlying contract provided a
non-assignment clause was valid because under Massachusetts law a non-assignment
clause bars only the delegation of duties but not the assignment of rights. This court,
incidentally, might have failed to notice that an arbitration agreement does not only
entitle a party to participate in an arbitration procedure (a right), but also forbids it to
bring suit before a court (a duty)).
30
See Código de Comercio [C. Com.] (Colom.). art. 887.
27
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arbitration have chosen. Usually, the parties will settle on national or
domestic law. Once again, the New Statute is silent on the choice of
law issue. Consequently arbitrating parties might provide that two or
more national laws will govern various aspects of the dispute, a practice
referred to as a dépeçage in Colombia. This practice is in sync with
modern contractual and arbitral statutes.31 For instance, the parties to a
contract for the sale of a business which includes both real property and
intellectual property might provide that the laws of Country X, where
the property is located, will apply to settle any dispute related to the real
property, while the laws of Country Y, where some patents are registered, will govern any dispute regarding the intellectual property.32
The parties might also provide that international legal rules, such
as the Convention on International Sale of Goods or the UNIDROIT
Principles for International Commercial Contracts, will exclusively
govern the settlement of the dispute.33 Furthermore, parties may decide
to use that the well-recognized principles of international commercial
law, lex mercatoria, as the governing law. 34 Alternatively, parties could
provide that the contract is self-sufficient and, therefore, no rules of law
govern it.35 However, parties should avoid a clause providing amorphous
notions such as the lex mercatoria. Such a clause can be a likely cause
of unnecessary and additional disputes about the applicable governing
law, thus increasing the expenses and decreasing the predictability of an
arbitral award settling a future dispute.36

See, e.g., Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations art.
3 (1980) (enabling the parties to choose several laws to govern different parts of an
international contract); and the 1997 AAA International Arbitration Rules art. 28(1)
(entitling arbitrators to apply the substantive laws that the parties have provided).
32
For international tribunals in which the arbitrators have applied more than one
law to the controversy, see, e.g., Saudi Arabia v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (ARAMCO), 27
Int’l L. Rep. 117, 166 (1963). For an analysis of dépeçage in international commercial
arbitration, see generally Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International Commercial
Arbitration 794, 879 (Emmanuel Gaillard & John Savage eds.,1999).
33
For international tribunals in which the arbitrators have applied general principles
of commercial law, see, e.g., ICC case No. 53333 (unpublished).
34
See generally Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International Commercial
Arbitration 801–07 (Emmanuel Gaillard & John Savage eds.,1999); ); Gary B. Born,
International Commercial Arbitration 556–57 (2nd ed., 2001).
35
Id.
36
See generally Emmanuel Gaillard & John Savage (Ed.), Fouchard Gaillard
Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration 795, 799 (1999).
31
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Pursuant to Article 101 of New Statute, based on UNCITRAL
Model Law Art. 28(2), if the parties failed to provide the governing
law, the arbitral tribunal will apply the laws that are more closely connected to the subject-matter of the dispute.37 Needless to say, neglecting
to provide the governing law in an arbitration agreement underlying an
international contract is unwise and likely the result of negligence; in
such a case, the arbitrators are free to apply legal rules that neither party
would have chosen.38
On the other hand, Article 92 of the New Statute provides that
parties to an international arbitration are not only allowed to choose
the laws applicable to the substance of the dispute, but also to choose
the rules governing the arbitral proceedings.39 In short, the parties
with a Colombian venue are allowed to exclude the application of the
Colombian procedural rules in international arbitration. Thus, the rules
governing the substance of the dispute might be the federal laws of
the United States while the rules applicable to the arbitral proceedings
might be ICC rules.40
D. Arbitration Procedure under the New Statute
1. The Nomination of Arbitrators in Multi-party
Arbitration
Article 74 of the New Statute provides the guidelines for multi-party
arbitration. Therein, if an arbitral tribunal is composed of three arbitrators and either party is composed of two or more members, the parties
shall act together to appoint their arbitrator.41 However, parties may
contract around this rule and choose another method. If the members of
In strict sense, the arbitrators do not choose the law but just apply the laws of the
national system with most connection to the subject-matter of the dispute based on the
elements of the contract and on the will of the parties.
38
See generally David V. Snyder & Martin Davies, International Transaction
in Goods 20 (2012) (categorizing as professional negligence an attorney’s failure to
include a governing law clause in a contract with some transnational component).
39
Regarding the distinction between substantial and procedural laws, see Gary B.
Born, International Commercial Arbitration 540 (2nd ed., 2001).
40
See generally ICC Interim Arbitral Award 4695, Parties from Brazil, Panama
and the United States v. Party from Brazil, ZI Y.B. Com. Arb. 149 (1986) (holding
that the parties chose the Brazilian law for the underlying contract but the ICC rules
regarding the procedural aspects for the arbitration and that, therefore, the Brazilian
Civil Procedure Code was not applicable to the dispute).
41
L. 1563/12 supra note 3, art. 108.1(b).
37
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the multi-party claimant or respondent cannot agree on the individual to
be appointed as an arbitrator, any of the parties might request a court to
consider an outside measure, such as the appointment of the arbitrator.
This legal rule, an innovation in Colombian law, efficiently resolves
a traditionally difficult issue in international commercial arbitration:
multi-party situations.42 A multi-party situation is a controversy in
which one or both sides are, in turn, composed of two or more parties.43
Indeed, if the new Colombian legal rule on multi-party arbitration was
omitted, a losing party would be left with limited options. The party
would either apply for setting aside the award, on the grounds of not
having been able to defend its rights,44 or file a legal recourse, named a
tutela,45 against the award, contending that the lack of equal opportunities in the appointment of the arbitrators breached its fundamental right
of due process.46

A multi-party arbitration, the matter discussed here, should not be confused with
a different notion: a multi-contract situation, in which several contracts are subject to
the same or to similar arbitration agreements (e.g., a master or an umbrella distribution
contract and its subsequent sale contracts). Regarding multi-contract situations, two
different issues may arise: (1) some of the contracts have an arbitration clause but
the others lack it; and (2) all contracts have arbitration clauses, which differ in some
substantial aspect, such as, for instance, the venue of the arbitration. In respect of the
first issue, L. 1563/12, based on UNCITRAL Model Law Art. 7(6) provides that “the
reference in a contract to any document containing an arbitration clause constitutes an
arbitration agreement in writing.” The new Colombian statute, however, is silent on the
second issue, although the parties might fill this gap by providing, for instance, that
the ICC Rules will govern the arbitral proceedings. See ICC Rules art. 9 (For the ICC
Rules on multi-contract situations. “Subject to the provisions of Articles 6(3)–6(7) and
23(4), claims arising out of or in connection with more than one contract may be made
in a single arbitration, irrespective of whether such claims are made under one or more
than one arbitration agreement under the Rules.”); and Art.10 (“The Court may, at the
request of a party, consolidate two or more arbitrations pending under the Rules into a
single arbitration . . . c) where the claims in the arbitrations are made under more than
one arbitration agreement, the arbitrations are between the same parties, the disputes
in the arbitrations arise in connection with the same legal relationship, and the Court
finds the arbitration agreements to be compatible.”).
43
See generally Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International Commercial
Arbitration 468–70 (Emmanuel Gaillard & John Savage eds.,1999).
44
See L. 1563/12 supra note 3, art. 108.1(b).
45
The so-called tutela is a writ for the protection of fundamental rights. For a deeper
analysis of the tutela in arbitration, see infra p. 25.
46
See generally Constitución Política de Colombia [C.P.] art. 29, 86.
42
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The issue of multi-party arbitration arose in Siemens AG/BKMI v.
Dutco Construction Company,47 where BKMI executed a contract to
build a cement factory for an Omani company. Later, BKMI entered
into a silent consortium agreement with Siemens and Dutco, which
contained an arbitration agreement under the ICC Rules.48 A dispute
arose between the parties to the consortium agreement and Dutco initiated arbitral proceedings against BKMI and Siemens.49 Although the
respondents argued that Dutco should have filed two separate claims
against them, only one arbitral tribunal was established, with BKMI and
Siemens listed together as the Respondent, and nominated their joint
arbitrator under protest.50 BKMI and Siemens then challenged the ICC
award on the grounds that they did not receive the same opportunities as
Dutco in the nomination of the arbitrators.51 France’s highest court for
judicial matters, the Cour de Cassation agreed with BKMI and Siemens
and set aside the award.52 This holding led to an amendment of the ICC
Rules, which now guarantee that all parties have the same rights in the
nomination of arbitrators.53
2. Grounds for Challenging the Appointment of an
Arbitrato
Based on UNCITRAL Model Law Art. 12(2), Article 65 of the New
Statute provides that the appointment of an arbitrator may only be challenged when existing circumstances give rise to justifiable doubts to the
arbitrator’s impartiality or independence, or if the arbitrator’s qualifications are not in accordance with the agreement of the parties.54 As a
general rule, a party challenging an arbitrator will have more success

See Siemens AG/BKMI v. Ducto Construction Company, XVII YBCA 140 (1993).
See id.
49
See id.
50
See id.
51
See id. Under ICC Rules the parties do not appoint but nominate the arbitrators
subject to the approval of the ICC Court. See ICC Rules art. 12.2
52
See Cass. 1e civ., Jan. 7, 1992, B.K.M.I. v. Dutco, 1992 Bull. Civ. I, No. 2; 1992
Rev. Arb. 470 (holding that, as a matter of public policy, the parties shall be in equal
conditions regarding the designation of arbitrators unless they have waived their rights
after the dispute has arisen). See also Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International
Commercial Arbitration 468 (Emmanuel Gaillard & John Savage eds.,1999).
53
See ICC Rules art. 6.4(i).
54
See also ICC Rules art. 11 (“Every arbitrator must be and remain impartial and
independent of the parties involved in the arbitration.”).
47
48
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in proving that he or she is not independent—an objective notion—as
opposed to proving than he or she is not subjectively impartial.55 In
addition, Article 73.1 of the New Statute partially based on UNCITRAL
Model Law Art. 11(1),56 provides that an individual shall not be precluded by reason of his or her nationality from acting as an arbitrator.57
The New Statute, however, is silent on whether an arbitrator may have
the same nationality of any of the parties.58
II. Awards and Arbitral Measures under the New Statute
A. Provisional and Conservatory Measures
Under Article 80 of the New Statute, which is based on UNCITRAL
Model Law Art. 17, the arbitral tribunal is entitled to order provisional
and conservatory measures unless the parties agreed otherwise.59
According to the new Colombian statute,60 a provisional or conservatory measure is any measure by which the arbitral tribunal orders one
of the parties to (1) maintain or restore the status quo; (2) take action
that would prevent or to refrain from taking action that is likely to cause
harm or prejudice to the arbitral proceedings; (3) preserve assets that
may be used to enforce a future award; and (4) preserve evidence that
may be relevant and material to the resolution of the dispute.61
See generally Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International Commercial
Arbitration 553-54 (Emmanuel Gaillard & John Savage eds.,1999); ); and Gary B.
Born, International Commercial Arbitration 626–28, 642–43 (2nd ed., 2001).
56
The word “partially” is used because the Colombian legal rule omits the text: “[U]
nless otherwise agreed by the parties”, which is part of UNCITRAL Model Law Art.
11(1). In spite of this omission, this article contends that the principle of freedom of
contract allows the parties to an arbitration agreement to contract around L. 1563/12
Art. 73(1).
57
L. 1563/12 supra note 3, art. 73.1.
58
See generally ICC Rules art. 13.1 (“In confirming or appointing arbitrators,
the Court shall consider the prospective arbitrator’s nationality, residence and other
relationships with the countries of which the parties or the other arbitrators are
nationals and the prospective arbitrator’s availability and ability to conduct the
arbitration in accordance with the Rules. The same shall apply where the Secretary
General confirms arbitrators pursuant to Article 13(2).”).
59
L. 1563/12 supra note 3, art. 80.
60
Id.
61
See generally Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International Commercial
Arbitration 709–34 (Emmanuel Gailard & John Savage eds.,1999); and Gary B.
Born, International Commercial Arbitration 935–80 (2nd ed., 2001).
55
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In practice, the provisional and conservatory measures that arbitral
tribunals order might face some challenges. First, Article 89 of the New
Statute, partially based on UNCITRAL Model Law Art. 17(I), provides
the grounds by which a court may refuse the enforcement of a provisional or conservatory measure. A judicial authority, for instance, may
ex officio deny the enforcement of either a provisional or a conservatory
measure that is against Colombian public policy.62 Taken broadly, courts
may refuse the enforcement of some provisional and conservatory
measures otherwise needed for the proper development of arbitral proceedings. To mitigate this concern, a recent judgment of the Colombian
Court of Supreme Justice restricted the scope of conservatory measures
for the defense of public policy.63
Perhaps a more important concern, the New Statute entitles domestic authorities to order provisional and conservatory measures before
and during an arbitration procedure. Thus, to accord with the New
Statute, the arbitration procedure must comply not only with the features of international arbitration, but also with domestic procedural
law.64 In certain instances, these provisional and conservatory measures,
ordered by a domestic court, may very well conflict with the measures
that the arbitral tribunal has ordered. For example, the arbitral tribunal might have ordered the attachment of funds that the defendant has,
while the court orders the opposite.65 To provide a clearer illustration, a
court may order the suspension of work under a construction contract,
See also UNCITRAL Model Law art. 17(I)(1)(b)(2).
See supra p. 16.
64
See L. 1563/12 supra note 3, art. 90. This legal rule is based on UNCITRAL
Model Law Art. 17.J., whose last part reads: “The court shall exercise such power
in accordance with its own procedures in consideration of the specific features
of international arbitration.” See generally Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on
International Commercial Arbitration 716 (Emmanuel Gaillard & John Savage
eds., 1999) (“Most laws now recognize that courts and the arbitrators have concurrent
powers to take certain conservatory measures.”).
65
See, e.g., McCreary & Tire & Rubber Co. v. CEAT S.p.A., 501 F.2d 1032, 1038
(3d Cir. 1974) (refusing to grant a foreign attachment on the grounds that it would be
a violation of the parties’ agreement to arbitrate their dispute). (refusing to follow the
McCreary rationale and maintaining an attachment of a debt that a third-party owed to
the defendant); see also Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International Commercial
Arbitration 712 (Emmanuel Gaillard & John Savage eds., 1999) (categorizing the
McCreary’s decision as plainly wrong because measures intended to ensure the
enforcement of a future award fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of courts). But see,
e.g., Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Uranex, 451 F. Supp. 1044, 1049–50 (1977).
62
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while the arbitral tribunal may issue an opposing order.66 These scenarios are more likely if the tribunal is applying a foreign procedural
law or the rules of an international institution, such as the ICC Rules,
while the court decides to apply Colombian procedural law. Hopefully,
Colombian courts will give more weight to the specific features of international arbitration than to its procedural law in cases where the former
are in conflict with the latter.
B. Grounds for Setting Aside an Award
Colombian law, partially based on Article 34 of the UNCITRAL
Model Law, gives exhaustive means by which a Colombian court may
set aside an award under Article 108 of the New Statute.67 This legal rule
also provides that the same court that sets aside an award is not allowed
to review the subject-matter of the dispute. Thus, Colombian courts
legally cannot second-guess the decisions made by the arbitrators.68
Pursuant to Article 108 of the New Statute,69 an award may be
vacated by a party’s request or ex officio. A party may file a recourse
against an arbitral award on the following grounds: (1) a party to the
arbitration agreement was incapacitated or the agreement was invalid
under its governing law (for example, a party may claim that it executed
the arbitration agreement under duress or by mistake); (2) the party filing the recourse was not given proper notice for the appointment of the
arbitrators, the beginning of the arbitral proceedings or, for any other
reason, in which the party was unable to make its case; (3) the award
relates to a dispute which is beyond the scope of the arbitration agreement; and (4) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or proceedings
were not in accordance with either the arbitration agreement or a mandatory rule preempting any provision of such agreement. In turn, a court
may, ex officio, set aside an award when: (1) the subject-matter of the
See Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration
723 (Emmanuel Gaillard & John Savage eds., 1999) (contending that in case of conflict
between provisional decisions intended to prevent irreparable harm, the decision of the
arbitral tribunal should prevail). See also Blumenthal v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc., 910 F.2d 1049, 1054–55 (1990) (upholding an arbitral decision which
had vacated a preliminary judicial injunction).
67
See L. 1563/12 supra note 3, art. 68, 108.
68
See generally Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International Commercial
Arbitration 977–83 (Emmanuel Gaillard & John Savage eds., 1999); and Gary B.
Born, International Commercial Arbitration 704–07, 757–58 (2nd ed., 2001).
69
L. 1563/12 supra note 3, art. 108.
66
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dispute was not capable of settlement by arbitration under Colombian
law but by a court;70 or (2) the award stands against the Colombian
international public policy. Thus, an award may be set aside if the losing
party proves that it was unable due to prejudice to make its case,71 or if
such award is contrary to the Colombian international public policy.72
From a theoretical standpoint, the New Statute provides exhaustive
grounds to set aside an award, which may contribute to the efficiency
of arbitral proceedings by making them shorter and more predictable.
In practice, however, the future does not look as promising. First,
Colombian courts might attempt to review substantial issues using any
one of the exhaustive grounds as a pretense. While Colombian courts
are not allowed to review the substance of the dispute, they might yield
to the temptation; indeed, many of the grounds to set aside an award, for
instance, are very general and vague, facilitating a de novo analysis of
the subject matter of the dispute. Second, arbitration awards may be set
aside without merit if the court finds they stand contrary to Colombian
international public policy.
A recent judgment of the Colombian Court of Supreme Justice
partially alleviates the concern that a court will find an award stands
against Colombian international public policy.73 In M.P.R. Diaz, the
Colombian Supreme Court held that the notion of public policy should
be limited to the fundamental principles of Colombian institutions,
such as the prohibition of abuse of rights, good faith, the impartiality of
the arbitral tribunal, and the compliance with the due process.74 In this
sense, the Court reasoned, the fact that an arbitral tribunal did not apply
See Consejo de Estado [C.E.] [Council of State], agosto 29, 2012, C.P. O. Valle,
Expediente 11001032600020120002601 (43456), Anales del Consejo de Estado
[An.C.E.) (Colom.).
71
See L. 1563/12 supra note 3, art. 108(1)(b). Admittedly, the ambiguity of this
provision is also existent in the almost identical text of UNCITRAL Model Law Art.
34(2)(a)(2) (“[T]he party making the application was not given proper notice of the
appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to
present his case.”).
72
See Eco Swiss China Time Ltd v Benetton Int’l NV, 1 June 1999, European Court
of Justice, Case C-126/97 [1999]. Compare L. 1563/12 supra note 3, art. 108(2)(b),
with UNCITRAL Model Law art. 34(2)(b)(2) (“[T]he award is in conflict with the
public policy of this State.”).
73
See Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala. Civ., julio 27,
2011, M.P. R. Díaz, Expediente 11001-0203-000-2007-01956-00, Gaceta Judicial
[G.J.] (Colom.).
74
See id. at 46.
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a Colombian mandatory rule does not per se entail that the enforcement
of the award shall be refused.75 While the judgment was related to the
enforcement of a foreign arbitral award, the court’s rationale may be
applied to future proceedings deciding future awards.
The risk that a Colombian court reviews the subject-matter of the
dispute on a de novo basis may also be eliminated, or at least mitigated,
if all the parties to an arbitration have their places of business outside
of Colombia. In such a case, the parties are allowed to either exclude
the recourse to set aside the award or limit the award on grounds provided by the New Statute (e.g., the award can be vacated on grounds of
validity).76
As a consequence, the recourse to set aside an award shall be filed
within the following month of its notification.77 Surprisingly, such a time
frame is shorter than the three-month lapse provided by Article 34(3) of
the UNCITRAL Model Law. At first glance, this new Colombian legal
rule might improve the efficiency and predictability of arbitral proceedings by reducing the number of cases in which a Colombian court might
be tempted to review, when deciding whether to set aside an award.
Naturally, informed and sophisticated parties that did not prevail in the
arbitral proceedings should not face great difficulties to file the recourse
for setting aside the award during the time frame indicated above.
Another reason courts should not review the substance of an award
is because of the writ for the protection of fundamental rights, the tutela.78 Article 108 of the New Statute is silent about whether the losing
party in an arbitration procedure may file a tutela against an award.
Admittedly, Article 109.5 of the New Statute strictly prohibits the filing

See id.
See L. 1563/12 supra note 3, art. 108. In the globalized economy, it might
be possible that one of the places of business of one or more parties is situated in
Colombia. Notwithstanding, if the relevant place of businesses for the subject-matter
of the dispute is located outside Colombia, the parties would be allowed to exclude the
recourse to set aside the award. See L. 1563/12 supra note 3, art. 62.
77
See L.1563/12 supra note 3, art. 108. On a separate note, the new Colombian
statute does not include UNCITRAL Model Law Art. 34 (4), which provides: “The
court, when asked to set aside an award, may, where appropriate and so requested by
a party, suspend the setting aside proceedings for a period of time determined by it in
order to give the arbitral tribunal an opportunity to resume the arbitral proceedings or
to take such other action as in the arbitral tribunal’s opinion will eliminate the grounds
for setting aside.”
78
See Constitución Política de Colombia [C.P.] art. 86.
75
76
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of recourse against the judgment refusing to set aside an award. It would
appear that an arbitral award would not be subject to a tutela. The tutela,
however, is a recourse enshrined in the Colombian Constitution, which
preempts any legal authority of inferior hierarchy, including those stated
in the New Statute.79 A losing party in an arbitral procedure, therefore,
would be entitled to file a tutela against the award, on the grounds that a
fundamental right, much like due process, has been violated.80
While recourses intended to protect fundamental rights in other contexts can be beneficial, the tutela might make arbitral proceedings and
awards unpredictable, expensive, and lengthy. As an additional rationale, informed and sophisticated parties deciding to settle their disputes
through international arbitration should be aware that the procedures
and arbitrators that they have chosen and appointed are enough of a
guarantee to protect their fundamental rights.
The rationale of courts, however, may differ. Under the rationale of
protecting the fundamental rights of the losing party, a court deciding
a tutela might yield to the temptation of reviewing the substance of the
subject-matter of the dispute.81 Moreover, even if the court holds that
the award did not breach the fundamental rights of the party who filed
the tutela, and the enforcement would be greatly delayed and the litigation expenses enlarged. As a result, sophisticated and farsighted parties
might prefer, at the making of arbitration agreements in international
contracts, to choose a venue outside Colombia.
C. Enforcement of Awards against the Landscape of the New
York Convention
While Colombia ratified the New York Convention on Enforcement
and Recognition of International Awards (“NY Convention”) in 1990,82
domestic law predating the New Statute provided additional grounds for

See id.
See id. art. 4.
81
See Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], febrero 2, 2009,
M.P.: J. Araujo, Sentencia T-058-2009, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.]
(Colom.). See also Fernando Mantilla, Colombia, ¿sede de arbitraje internacional?
[Colombia, A Venue for International Arbitrations?], Ámbito Jurídico, Jul. 24, 2012,
at 8 (available at http:// http://www.ambitojuridico.com/BancoConocimiento/N/
noti-120724-06%28colombia_sede_de_arbitraje_internacional%29/noti-12072406%28colombia_sede_de_arbitraje_internacional%29.asp).
82
See L. 39/90, noviembre 20, 1990, Diario Oficial [D.O.] (Colom.).
79
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the refusal of an enforcement of a foreign arbitral award.83 In particular,
Article 694 of the Code of Civil Procedure84 provided that an award
could only be enforced in Colombia if: (1) the dispute did not center
on real property located in Colombia at the beginning of the arbitral
proceedings; (2) the award was not against any Colombian immutable
rule other than procedural laws; (3) the award was not only in legal
force in the country of origin but also duly legalized and authenticated;
(4) the subject-matter of the dispute did not fall under the exclusive
jurisdiction of Colombian courts; (5) no process or judgment on the
same facts exist in Colombia; (6) the award was issued in a litigious
process that complied with the due process of the respondent; and (7)
the party complied with the exequatur requirement—the procedure by
which the Supreme Court of Justice decides whether a foreign award or
judgment is enforceable in Colombia.85
Prior to the enactment of the New Statute, the Colombian Supreme
Court of Justice held that an award whose enforcement was sought shall
comply, not only with the requirements of the NY Convention Art. V,
but also with the conditions set forth by Article 694 of the Code of Civil

Regarding the literature on enforcement of foreign awards, see generally Fouchard
Gaillard Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration 889-98 (Emmanuel
Gaillard & John Savage eds., 1999) and Gary B. Born, International Commercial
Arbitration 711–744 (2nd ed., 2001).
84
This Code of Civil Procedure will be gradually replaced by a new Code, the socalled Code of General Procedure (hereinafter “C.G.P.”), enacted by L. 1564/12, julio
12, 2012, Diario Oficial [D.O.] (Colom.). Some provisions of this Code have been in
legal force since July 12, 2012 while the remaining provisions will be in legal force
between October 1, 2012 and January 1, 2014. See C.G.P. art. 627.
85
See C.P.C. art. 695; Law 1564 of 2012 (Code of General Procedure) art. 30.4–5.
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Procedure.86 This case law was in breach of the NY Convention, whose
Art. V provides the exhaustive grounds to refuse the enforcement of a
foreign arbitral award.87
The new Colombian statute resolves this issue through some of
its provisions.88 First, Article 112 of the New Statute provides that the
enforcement of the award can only be refused on the exhaustive grounds
that the NY Convention provides.89 Second, pursuant to Article 114 of
the New Statute, the rules of the Code of Civil Procedure related to
the grounds, requirements, and proceedings to refuse the enforcement
of foreign decisions are applicable to judgments, but not to arbitral
awards.90
Other provisions of the New Statute also contribute to the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Article 111.1, for instance, provides
See, e.g., Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala. Civ., mayo 12,
2011, M.P. W. Namen, Expediente 11001-0203-000-2011-00581-00, Gaceta Judicial
[G.J.] (Colom.) (refusing to enforce a foreign award because it did not comply with
Colombian Procedural Civil Code Art. 694, which requires evidence that the award is
not subject to further legal resource); and Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme
Court], Sala. Civ., marzo 1, 1999, M.P. J. Ramírez, Expediente E-7474, Gaceta Judicial
[G.J.] (Colom.) (refusing the enforcement of a foreign award on the grounds that it was
not a final award). But see Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala.
Civ., noviembre 19, 2011, M.P. F. Giraldo, Expediente 1100102030002008-01760-00,
Gaceta Judicial [G.J.] (Colom.) (holding that a party challenging the enforcement of
a foreign award cannot claim grounds other than those that the NY Convention Art.
V provides); and Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala. Civ., julio
27, 2011, M.P. R. Díaz, Expediente 2007-01956-00, Gaceta Judicial [G.J.] (Colom.)
(denying to refuse the enforcement of an award on an alleged non-compliance with
Colombian Procedural Civil Code Art. 694 because the only grounds to refuse such
enforcement are those that the NY Convention provides). In any event, the lack of
uniformity of the case law on enforcement of foreign arbitral awards was not conducive
to the predictability and efficiency of arbitral proceedings.
87
See New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards (1958) art. V.
88
Hopefully, these provisions will contribute to reduce the time that enforcement
of a foreign arbitral award currently takes, which is very long. See Fernando Mantilla
Serrano, Colombia ¿Sede de Arbitraje Internacional? Ámbito Jurídico, July 24,
2012, at 8, available at http://www.ambitojuridico.com/BancoConocimiento/N/
noti-120724-06%28colombia_sede_de_arbitraje_internacional%29/noti-12072406%28colombia_sede_de_arbitraje_internacional%29.asp.
89
These grounds are reproduced in UNCITRAL Model Law Art. 36.
90
See also Law 1563/12 art. 118 (repealing the last part of Code of Civil Procedure
Art. 693, which provided that the legal rules on the enforcement of foreign judgments
were also applicable to the enforcement of foreign awards).
86
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that all arbitral awards, regardless of the country where they were
issued, are enforceable in Colombia, provided the awards comply with
the requirements set forth in the NY Convention. In another example,
Article 111.3 of the New Statute provides that an international arbitration award issued in Colombia is to be regarded as a national award
and, therefore, automatically enforceable without need of further proceedings. This provision, which is only inapplicable when the parties
both have their places of business outside Colombia and have waived
the recourse for setting aside an award,91 might contribute to making
Colombia a favorable place for international arbitrations. However,
the law raises the question of whether any translation is needed in case
the award is written in any language other than Spanish. This question
appears to be answered in the affirmative, based on an extensive interpretation of Article 111.2 of the New Statute. This legal rule provides
that a court deciding a case in which a party invokes an arbitral award
may request its translation to Spanish.92
III. Challenges on the Horizon for the New Statute in International
Arbitration
Many questions remain regarding how arbitrators and, more particularly Colombian courts, will apply the new legal rules on international
arbitration. Inherent to the development of a new law, the New Statute
will face some challenges in its application among scholars and courts
against arbitration as an alternative method to settle disputes, and the
negative effects that the tutela may have on the efficiency and predictability of arbitral proceedings.

See L. 1563/12 supra note 3, art. 107 and 111.3.
Regarding the language of the arbitration, L. 1563/12 art. 95, based on
UNCITRAL Model Law Art. 22, provides that the parties may agree on the language or
languages that will be used in the arbitration procedure. This legal rule, an innovation
in Colombia law, may save transaction costs for multinational companies deciding to
arbitrate disputes in Colombia without the need of spending money and time in the
translation of voluminous documents or in the hiring of translators for its lawyers,
experts and advisors. As a result, this provision might contribute to make Colombia,
and particularly Bogotá—its capital—a favorable venue for international arbitrations.

91
92
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Regarding the first challenge, legal systems may be either proarbitration or anti-arbitration.93 France94 and the United States95 are
examples of pro-arbitration legal systems. Colombia, on the other hand,
has struggled to embrace a cohesive pro-arbitration system. For one, the
Council of State has struck down domestic arbitral awards based on a
broad interpretation of the exhaustive grounds that Colombian laws provide.96 Moreover, as discussed earlier in this Article,97 the Colombian
Supreme Court of Justice has refused to enforce foreign arbitral awards,
because the award did not comply with domestic procedural rules.98
Finally, the Colombian Constitutional Court struck down an arbitral
award in order to protect fundamental rights,99 and has held that arbitration is a judicial procedure and, therefore, subject to all procedural
To be sure, most legal systems are located at some point of a spectrum whose polar
modes are a system that is completely anti-arbitration and a system that is completely
pro-arbitration.
94
See nouveau code de procédure civile (N.C.P.C.) art.1448 (providing that the
jurisdiction will hold itself incompetent in matters concerning an arbitration agreement
except when the tribunal has not yet been constituted or when the arbitration agreement
is null and void or inapplicable).
95
Regarding statutory law, see Federal Arbitration Act Section 2 (“A written
provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract
or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement
in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract,
transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”). In respect of
case law, see, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 615 (1985) (reminding that federal policy favors arbitration); and AT&T Mobility
LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011) (concluding that federal arbitration
law preempts state judicial rulings by which some arbitration agreements in consumer
contracts were held unconscionable).
96
See, e.g., Consejo de Estado [C.E.] [Council of State], agosto 9, 2012, C.P. M.
Fajardo, Expediente 110010326000201200013 00 (43.045), Anales del Consejo de
Estado [An.C.E.) (Colom.); and Consejo de Estado [C.E.] [Council of State], febrero
18, 2010, C.P. E. Gil, Expediente 11001-03-26-000-2009-00058-00(37004), Anales
del Consejo de Estado [An.C.E.) (Colom.). See also D. 1818/98, septiembre 7, 1998,
Diario Oficial [D.O.] (Colom.). art. 163.
97
See supra part A.
98
See, e.g., Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala. Civ., mayo 12,
2011, M.P. W. Namen, Expediente 11001-0203-000-2011-00581-00, Gaceta Judicial
[G.J.] (Colom.).
99
See Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitucional Court], febrero 2, 2009, M.P.: J.
Araujo, Sentencia T-058-2009, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (Colom.).
93
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legal rules.100 Indeed, the Colombian case law of its three highest courts
indicates that Colombia is governed by an anti-arbitration legal system.
The development of arbitration as an efficient method for dispute resolution has been a polarized topic of academic discussion in
Colombia.101 On the one hand, scholars defending the procedural nature
of arbitration argue that the rules of civil procedure are mandatory and,
therefore, parties to arbitration agreements should not be allowed to
exclude or contract around them.102 On the other hand, some scholars
defend the contractual nature of arbitration;103 as a result, they argue
that parties are allowed to provide their own procedural rules as long as
the right to due process is not compromised.104
In any event, the anti-arbitration stance of some courts and scholars
may signal that some structural and cultural elements favorable to the
development of arbitration, present in other legal systems, are absent in

See Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitucional Court], noviembre 28, 2002,
M.P.: E. Montealegre, Sentencia C-1038-2002, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional
[G.C.C.] (Colom.).
101
See generally Gabriel Hernández, Medidas Cautelares en los Procesos Arbitrales
¿Taxatividad o Enunciación de las Cautelas? [Interim Measures in Arbitral
Proceedings, Mandatory or Optative Measures?] 9(1) Rev. Estudios Jurídicos 183
(2007).
102
See, e.g., Ramiro Bejarano, El Sofá del Arbitraje [The Couch of Arbitration],
30 Rev. del Instituto Colombiano de Derecho Procesal 237 (2004); and Ramiro
Bejarano, Falacias del Arbitraje Nacional y Sugerencias para su Reforma [Fallacies
of Domestic Arbitration and Suggestions for its Amendment), in Memorias del XXIII
Congreso Colombiano de Derecho Procesal (Minutes of the XXIII Colombian
Congress on Procedural LAw) 69 (2002).
103
Incidentally, the nature of arbitration in the United States is clearly contractual.
See Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S.Ct. 2772, 2776 (2010) (“[A]rbitration
is a matter of contract.”).
104
See, e.g., Fernando Mantilla, ¿Existe Hostilidad hacia el arbitraje de inversión
en América Latina? [Is there a hostility towards international arbitration in Latin
America? [Is There an Hostility Against Investment Arbitration in Latin America?], in
789 Liber Amicorum in Honor of Bernardo Cremades (2010); and
Eduardo Silva, Reflexiones Sobre el Contrato de Arbitraje – Algunas Confusiones
Conceptuales en Derecho Colombiano [Thought on the Arbitration Agreement –
Some Fundamental Misconceptions in Colombian Law], in Estudios de Derecho
Civil, Obligaciones y Contratos [Studies on Civil Law, Obligations and Contracts] 284 (2003).
100
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Colombia.105 This article develops the view that a wise application of the
new legal rules will create a better future for international arbitration in
Colombia. To take an example,106 Article 67 of the New Statute provides
that in matters related to international arbitration, courts are not allowed
to intervene unless such law expressly authorizes them to do so (e.g., to
order provisional and conservatory measures,107 to appoint an arbitrator,
108
or to appoint an expert).109
Notwithstanding, it is still uncertain whether Colombian courts will
construe the new rules according to its plain meaning, which is proarbitration, or increase the scope of their judicial powers by means of
a broad interpretation based on fundamental rights. The key issue is
whether Colombian courts will uphold the arbitration agreements and
proceedings that the parties provided in accordance with freedom of
contract, a basic legal principle, which underlies the New Statute.
The second challenge relates to the so-called recourse of the tutela.
As indicated above, any individual or judicial person may file before a
court a tutela requesting an injunction intended to protect its fundamental rights.110 Thus, an individual or company who has lost in arbitration
may file a tutela claiming that the award breached any of its fundamental rights. The party filing the tutela, for example, might claim that the

See generally Ronald J. Scalise, Why No “Efficient Breach: in the Civil Law?:
A Comparative Assessment of the Doctrine of Efficient Breach of Contract, 55 Am. J.
Comp. L. 721, 725 (2007) (mentioning, in reference to the doctrine of efficient breach,
that “[j]ust as human life needs a certain percentage of oxygen and other elements in
the Earth’s atmosphere in order to thrive, so too the theory of efficient breach flourishes
when a legal system contains certain structural and cultural elements favorable to
the development of the doctrine. Perhaps Anglo-American common law, like Earth,
contains an abundance of favorable elements that seem not to exist – at least to the
same extent – in other systems or on other planets.” An analogy might be made to the
success of arbitration in Colombia).
106
This illustration is in addition to many other provisions of L. 1563/12, already
mentioned in this article (e.g., Art 92 – allowing the parties to international arbitration
to provide the rules governing the arbitral proceedings; Art. 97 – allowing the parties
to agree that no hearings shall be held and that the proceedings shall be conducted on
the basis of documents and other materials; and Art.108 – providing the exhaustive
grounds by which a court may set aside an award).
107
L. 1563/12 supra note 3, art. 71, 90.
108
L. 1563/12 supra note 3, art. 74.
109
L. 1563/12 supra note 3, art. 100.
110
See Colombian Constitution art. 86; Decree 2351 art. 1.
105
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arbitral proceedings breached its fundamental right of due process,111
or that the arbitral award was based de facto standard of review—in
Spanish “vía de hecho”—and not in legal proceedings.112 Regrettably,
the notion of due process is nebulous; therefore, the court deciding a
tutela against an arbitral award might yield to the temptation of adopting a de novo standard of review, setting aside the arbitral procedure to
review its substance.113
In theory, a tutela against an arbitral award would rarely succeed because this recourse is only available when the claiming party
either suffers an irreparable harm or would not have any other judicial recourse.114 While the losing party usually suffers an irreparable
harm because of the award, it is a harm that the law authorizes. Indeed,
any party that fails to prevail in trial will suffer financial risk or harm.
Moreover, the losing party not only argued the merits of its case during
the arbitral proceedings, but was also entitled to judicial recourse for
setting aside the award.
In practice, however, a tutela is a judicial recourse that losing
parties frequently use to strike down awards with some likelihood of
success, as seen in Empresa de Telecomunicaciones de Bogotá S.A.

See, e.g., Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitucional Court], julio 15, 1992,
M.P.: J. Hernández, Sentencia T-460-1992, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.]
(Colom.); and Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitucional Court], octubre 26, 2001,
M.P.: J. Sanín, Sentencia T-572-1992, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.]
(Colom.).
112
See Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitucional Court], febrero 2, 2009, M.P.; J.
Araujo, Sentencia T-058-2009, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (Colom.).
A de facto proceeding (in Spanish: “vía de hecho”) occurs when an arbitrator takes a
decision that breaches or limits the scope of a fundamental right, does not include the
reasons that support the decision, or directly breaches the Colombian Constitution. See
Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitucional Court], junio 8, 2005, M.P.: J. Córdoba,
Sentencia C-590-2005, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (Colom.).
113
Even worse, in strict sense, a tutela is composed of three instances: the trial court,
the court of appeals and the revision by the Constitutional Court; thereby, the delay in
the enforcement of an award that a tutela challenges might be longer. Indeed, a losing
party would usually have the incentive to file a tutela against an arbitral award. If it
prevails in court, the award would be stricken down; if the tutela is refused, the benefit
resulting from the delay of the enforcement of the award might outweigh the expenses
of this proceeding.
114
See Constitución Política de Colombia [C.P.] art. 86 and Decree 2351/91,
noviembre 19, Diario Oficial [D.O.] (Colom.). art. 1.
111
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(“ETB”) v. Telefónica Móviles Colombia S.A. (“Telefónica”).115 In this
infamous domestic case, often considered a stumbling block for the
development of both national and international arbitration in Colombia,
the Colombian Constitutional Court held that the party filing a tutela
against an award does not have another judicial recourse because the
application for setting aside an award is not intended to protect fundamental rights.116
In ETB, the dispute between the parties focused on the contracts
allowing ETB access, use, and interconnection of the telecommunication network of Telefónica in consideration for a price. An arbitral
award held that ETB breached the contracts and ordered ETB to pay
Telefónica around $60 million in damages. ETB filed a recourse for setting aside the award before the Council of State and, simultaneously, a
tutela. Both the trial court and the court of appeals denied ETB’s claims.
The Colombian Constitutional Court, however, reversed the decision of
the court of appeals and granted the tutela, and under the guise of protection of fundamental rights, reviewed the substance of the dispute and
struck down the arbitral award.
The court struck down the award on the grounds that the arbitrators
had applied the wrong legal rules to the subject matter of the dispute;
and, as a result, the fundamental right to due process was violated.
This decision would suggest that the award was manifestly against
Colombian laws, and the arbitrators were either unskilled lawyers or
not very knowledgeable regarding the legal rules applicable to the dispute. However, neither of these assumptions seems to be correct. First,
the legal rules applicable and the economic nature of the transaction
that gave rise to the lawsuit were ambiguous and complex. As a result,
there were as least as many arguments in support of the award as there
were in support of the court’s judgment. Therefore, the award was not
manifestly illegal. Second, the arbitrators were seasoned lawyers.117
Paradoxically, the president of the arbitral tribunal, Juan Carlos Henao,
was later appointed as the Chief Justice of the Colombian Constitutional

See Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], febrero 2, 2009, M.P.: J.
Araujo, Sentencia T-058-2009, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (Colom.).
116
See id.
117
Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], febrero 2, 2009, M.P.: J.
Araujo, Sentencia T-058-2009, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (Colom.)
(The arbitrators were Juan Carlos Henao, Jorge Enique Ibáñez, and Anne Marie Mürrle
Rojas.).
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Court. It is unlikely for a person holding the expertise and credentials
to be appointed as Chief Justice of the highest Colombian court to have
misapplied Colombian laws as an arbitrator.118
Unfortunately, the new legal rules on arbitration will likely have
little effect on the Colombian Constitutional Court to change this
jurisprudence. Indeed, the new Colombian statute is silent on the issue
of whether an arbitral award, either domestic or international, may be
subject to a tutela.119 Ideally, the New Statute would have provided that
arbitral awards, at least the international ones, were not subject to any
tutela. However, the Colombian Constitutional Court would have likely
struck down such a provision because it unreasonably restricts a constitutional recourse intended to protect fundamental rights. Similarly,
a provision in an arbitration agreement by which the parties agree not
to file a tutela against an arbitral award would likely be struck down
because the tutela is part of the fundamental tenets of Colombian law
and, therefore, the parties cannot waive this recourse before a dispute
arises. Consequently, in practice, parties to international arbitrations
whose venue is in Colombia must take into account the great likelihood
that the losing party will file a tutela to avoid or delay the enforcement
of a multimillion-dollar award.120

See Santiago Talero, La Tutela Contra el Laudo Arbitral del Caso ETB: Un Golpe
al Arbitraje y a la Seguridad Jurídica [The Tutela Against the Arbitral Award in the
Case ETB: A Blow to Arbitration and to the Legal Certainty], Portafolio, (Mar. 4,
2009), available at http://www.portafolio.co/opinion/blogs/juridica/la-tutela-contrael-laudo-arbitral-del-caso-etb-un-golpe-al-arbitraje-y-la-se.
119
L. 1563/12 supra note 3, art. 108 provides that the recourse for setting aside an
award is the only resource available. At first sight, this legal rule seems to exclude the
tutela. The new law, however, does not repeal the legal rules on tutela and is also of
inferior hierarchy to the constitutional rules entitling individuals and juridical persons
to file this recourse.
120
This concern may lead parties to international contracts to choose a venue outside
Colombia. See supra text accompanying note 90. (Where it mentions a recent case in
which sophisticated parties, both with assets in Colombia and one of them with its
place of business in this country, decided to choose New York as the venue instead of
Bogotá, Colombia to avoid two risks: (i) the application of the Colombian procedural
law to the arbitral proceedings, and (ii) the filing of a tutela. The parties were aware
that their decision entailed that the enforcement of the award in Colombia, in the
future, will require an additional and lengthy process, the so-called exequatur, before
the Colombian Supreme Court of Justice.).
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Conclusion
This article discusses the new Colombian statute on international
arbitration regarding its scope of application, the formalities of the
arbitration agreement, the governing law of the dispute, some issues on
multi-party arbitration, the grounds for challenging the appointment of
arbitrators, the provisional and conservatory measures, the application
for setting aside an award, and the enforcement of a foreign award. This
article also highlights the two main challenges that the new Colombian
statute will face: first, a bias among scholars and courts against arbitration as a method to settle disputes, and, second, the recourse of the
tutela.
If the new legal rules coupled with economic globalization gradually minimize this bias against arbitration and the tutela is not applied as
an additional de facto instance for arbitral proceedings, the Colombian
legal system might gradually become pro-arbitration. However, if the
new legal rules, in spite of being in accordance with the most recent
trends in international arbitration, are not applied or construed as
required to surpass these hurdles, the parties to international contracts
having connections with Colombia will conclude that arbitrations taking
place in the nation will be too expensive and unpredictable. Accordingly,
they will prefer to settle their disputes by arbitration in other venues or,
worse yet, decide to invest in other countries.

